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1 Introduction
In many European countries unemployment has been very high for almost
three decades. Many economists have ascribed the problem to lack of compe-
tition in labor markets plagued by institutional rigidities, such as employment
protection, generous unemployment benefits, compression in relative wages
due to collective bargaining, and so on. On the other hand, few countries
have removed these rigidities. Instead, governments have developed a lot of
(often very costly) policies with dubious effects, such as permanent budget
deficits, relief jobs in the public sector that did little to enhance the long-
term unemployed job prospects, and ”voodoo” economics such as working
time reduction. However, some marginal reforms have been implemented,
which may have had an effect. One example is the liberalization of tem-
porary contracts in Spain and other countries in the eighties and nineties.
Another is a recent reform of the French unemployment benefit system which
tightly monitors their job search. If one looks in detail at the history of labor
market reforms in a given European country, one finds the following charac-
teristics. First, reforms are pretty numerous and amount to an accumulation
of small changes. Second, some reforms tend to increrase labor market flexi-
bility, while others tend to reduce it. Third, for each individual reform it is
quite difficult to assess the magnitude of its impact.
Furthermore, the degree of labor market competition may also be affected
by other developments such as increases in product market competition due
to deregulation or greater openness to international trade. One may even
hope that such changes will help reduce European unemployment and thus
— although groups which benefit from labor rigidities also have an interest in
blocking these changes — spare painful reforms of the labor market1 . Thus
we might observe increases in labor market competition even in the absence
of labor market reforms.
This discussion suggests that rather than looking directly at policy mea-
1See Blanchard and Philippon (2003), for an analysis.
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sures it may be useful to look at the evolution of some quantitative measures
of labor market competition. It is what I try to do in this paper. I look
at the evolution of two very different measures of labor market competition
in a number of European countries between 1994 and 2000. The first mea-
sure captures inter-industry differences in wages, while the second is a proxy
for the welfare difference, in present discounted value terms, between the
employed and the unemployed.
2 Rents and their meaning
We define the ”rent” of an employed worker as the present discounted value
of his expected flow of future incomes, minus the present discounted value of
the income flow of an unemployed worker with similar characteristics.
Why are we interested in such a measure? Because it tells us how un-
competitive the labor market is. In a perfectly competitive labor market, the
unemployed would be able to underbid the employed up to the point where
people would be indifferent between being employed or unemployed. That
may mean full employment, in which case an unemployed would immediately
find a job, so that his situation would in effect be no different from that of
an employed, or it may mean that the wage has fallen to the level of unem-
ployment benefits (adjusted for the disutility of effort), in which case there
is ”voluntary” unemployment in the sense that the unemployed are in fact
indifferent about getting a job.
The rent also tells you how much you lose when you lose your job. In a
no-rent society the ”risk” of job loss is not a risk. People are insured against
it by the perfectly competitive labor market which makes them indifferent
between working and not working. All the implications of job loss being
painful derive from the facts that employed workers have rents.
Where do rents come from? They may come frommicroeconomic frictions
which prevent the labor market from being competitive. The theoretical lit-
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erature has identified a number of channels. The efficiency wage theory2, for
example, states that it is costly for firms to monitor their workers’ effort level.
Consequently, they prefer to pay above-market clearing wages so as to deter
shirking. This theory implies that the rent will be higher, the more severe
the informational problems in observing effort. The insider-outsider theory3
tells us that firms have sunk specific investments in locating and training
workers, which generates a hold-up problem. Once the investment is paid
for, the worker can expropriate part of it by asking above-market clearing
wages. This theory predicts that the rent is larger, the more important are
ex-ante specific investments in a given job4. It also predicts that the rent is
larger, the greater the worker’s ”bargaining power”, i.e. the share of the total
surplus that he is able to appropriate — although there is no straightforward
empirical equivalent of that parameter. The search and matching theory5 ex-
tends the insider-outsider theory to a general equilibrium framework where
there is a per-unit-of-time cost of maintaining a vacancy and the rate at
which they are filled depends on the ratio between the stock of unemploy-
ment and the stock of vacancies. The tighter the labor market, the longer it
takes to fill a vacancy, the larger the sunk hiring cost, and the greater the
rent; the theory hence predicts that there is a positive relationship between
the rent and labor market tightness. It also predicts that the rent is larger,
the greater the cost of vacancies and the less efficient the process of match-
ing between workers and firms. Finally, union wage-setting models directly
generate rents as unions act as monopolies in the labor market.
All these models also predict that a number of labor market regulations
will affect the rent. Firing costs will increase the rent under any of these
models; in the efficiency wage model, it makes it more costly to dismiss
workers when they have been caught shirking, thus raising the rent that
2See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Solow (1979), Schlicht (1978).
3See Lindbeck and Snower (1988), Blanchard and Summers (1986), Layard et al (1990).
4The macroeconomic consequences of the degree of specificity in investments are ex-
plored by Caballero and Hammour (1998).
5See for example Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
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must be paid to deter it. In the insider-outsider model, it acts as a sunk
cost, as it must be paid to get rid of the worker in order to replace him with
another one. Minimum wages directly increase the rent for those employed
workers for whom they are binding. Work rules may also increase rents to
the extent that they impose specific investments on firms and more generally
reduce competition between workers.
It is also true that product market regulation affects rents. By increas-
ing monopoly power, they increase a firm’s total revenue per worker; the
rent is increased as long as the workers have some ability to seize part of
that revenue. Under union wage-setting models, workers’ rents are linked to
product market competition via a simple law of derived demand. A more
regulated product market implies a lower price-elasticity of demand for each
firm, which in turn implies a lower wage-elasticity of labor demand, and thus
a higher wage.
We now briefly discuss the political consequences of rents6. Let us now go
back to the observation made above, that rents tell you how much you lose
when you lose your job. It implies that in an economy with rents, there will
be a general aversion to job loss, more so, the greater the rent. Therefore,
incumbent employees will tend to oppose policies that threaten their jobs
and to promote policies that protect them. That incentive would be absent
in an economy without rents. If rents differ among workers, they want to
support different policies, with workers with greater rents in favor of more
protection.
This implies that greater rents increase the support for employment pro-
tection legislation. Since we have seen that employment protection itself also
tends to increase rents, we have a mutual feedback there. Beyond that, any
shift that tends to increase rents should enhance the support for employment
protection. Thus, following the above arguments, we expect a greater polit-
ical support for employment protection after a hike in the minimum wage,
after a period of tight labor markets, or after any technological or organi-
6See Saint-Paul (1997, 2000, 2002) for an analytical treatment.
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zational change that would reduce a firm’s ability to monitor workers or its
required specific investment in a job.
Rents also easily generate politico-economic complementarities between
different labor market institutions. By a politico-economic complementarity
between institution A and institution B, I mean that the political support
for institution A is greater if institution B is in place, and vice-versa. As
I just argued, institutions that create (or increase) rents increase the polit-
ical support for employment protection. But employment protection itself
increases the political support from employed workers for institutions that
create rents, because it reduces their exposure to unemployment and thus
their prospects of losing the rent. Politico-economic complementarities im-
ply that a comprehensive labor market reform will have more support than
a piece-meal approach.
While rents increase the support for institutions that directly increase
employment protection, they also have a pervasive effect on the way people
view most policy changes. When the rent is high, incumbent employees have
a vested interest in opposing policies that threaten their jobs. This means
that any policy change which implies some labor reallocation will face greater
political opposition in economies with higher rents7. This applies to trade
liberalization, changes in the level and structure of government spending,
and so on. In other words, rents tend to generate a bias in favor of the status
quo in virtually any policy area.
The story of labor market flexibility in Europe in the 1990s is very much
that of a half-full, half-empty bottle; measures that have increased labor flex-
ibility have alternated with measures that have reduced it. Thus, from that
account we do not necessarily expect rents to fall; however, their evolution
in a given country may tell us which reforms have had the stronger effects.
On the other hands, greater trade integration and deregulation in product
markets is a clear trend. It should push rents downwards and if it has a large
enough effect on labor markets we should observe falling rents.
7See Saint-Paul (1996a).
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3 Measuring competition in European Labor
markets
There are various ways to assess whether or not European labor markets
are becoming more competitive. One possibility is to construct indices of
labor market regulation and look at their evolution over time in different
countries. Such an approach has been mostly pioneered by the OECD8. The
reliability of these indices depend on how quantitative the underlying vari-
ables are, and how reliable is the researcher’s assessment of the importance
of a given change in regulation. In some cases, it is easy to construct an
index because the regulation being measured has a clear quantitative defin-
ition. This is the case, for example, for unemployment benefits, where one
has constructed fairly reliable indices of replacement rations. However, even
in such a case, the index is not fully accurate as it fails to capture the diver-
sity of individual situations and the way the unemployment benefit system is
actually administered. Constructing indices of more qualitative regulations
such as employment protection is obviously even more complicated. These
indices do well in cross-sectional comparisons but are more problematic for
assessing evolutions over time9. For example, in the nineties many countries
have moved back and forth in the liberalization of temporary contracts, and
sometimes this has been accompanied by moves in the opposite direction
concerning the degree of protection of permanent contracts. It is not easy
to determine whether employment protection goes up or down if a reform
makes it harder to use temporary contracts but at the same time eases the
conditions under which a permanent worker may be dismissed.
Thus, it is useful to pursue a different approach, and try to look at direct
quantitative indicators of worker’s rents. The drawback of that approach is
that it does not tell us which reforms have been implemented; workers’ rents
may fall under a number of labor market reforms, product market reforms
8Typical is Grubb and Wells (1993) and the OECD’s Job Study (1994).
9Indeed, such indices as the Bertola (1990) one, are typically used for cross-sectional
studies.
6
or the sheer pressure of international competition. On the other hand, it
gives us an idea of the evolution of the true degree of competition in labor
markets. It avoids misclassifying a policy change or taking serious one which
turns out to have only second-order effects on actual labor market flexibility,
or which, for some reason, is not enforced.
To measure rents, we use two different approaches, that are described in
detail in the next two sections.
4 The inter-industry approach
The first one exploits variation across industries of wages. This empirical
regularity has been much studied in the eighties and nineties, under the im-
pulse of Krueger and Summers (1988). In particular, and that is most useful
for our purposes, the literature has shown that these differentials are not as-
sociated with compensating differentials for working conditions or nonwage
benefits, nor with unobservable worker heterogeneity. On the other hand,
they are correlated with a number of industry characteristics such as union
density, capital intensity, product market competition, and so on, that are
likely to be associated with the rent that can be extracted by workers and
their power to do so. In other words, there is a strong presumption that
differences in wages between industries are differences in rents rather than
anything else. Therefore, we hope to learn something about the evolution
over time of labor market rents in a number of European countries by look-
ing at how the estimated coefficients of a wage equation, in an individual
data set, on industry dummies evolve. If rents are falling over time, then we
expect the dispersion in these coefficients across sectors to be falling too: In
a rent-free economy, all of them would be equal to zero. Assuming that the
least-paying sector is more or less perfectly competitive, we can also define
an average rent by looking at the employment-weighted average of the differ-
ence between a sector’s coefficient and that of the least-paying sector. That
alternative measure allows to capture changes in the rent that are due to
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labor reallocation from high-rent to low-rent sectors, whereas the dispersion
measure gives us an idea of the evolution of the rent, in a given sector.
The data we use is the European Household Panel Survey. The advantage
is that it has data on wages, individual characteristics and labor market
status, that are consistent across countries, and available for all EU members.
Its panel dimension allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity among
individuals by making use of fixed-effect estimators. The drawback is that it
has fewer observations than a typical national labour force survey, and that
data for Germany and the UK are not available after 1994.
We estimate wage equations for each of the countries. Each observation
is an individual at a given date, and the specification is
lnwit = b0ED3it + b1ED2it + b2AGEit + b3AGE2it + b4MARRIED (1)
+b5SEXit +
TX
s=2
NX
k=1
cks(IDkit ∗ TDsit) +
NX
k=2
ck1(IDkit ∗ TD1it) + c0,
where
TDs = Time dummy for date s.TDsit = 1 if t = s, 0 if not.
IDk = Industry dummy for industry k. IDkit = 1 if individual i works in
industry k at date t, 0 if not.
T = Number of periods,
and other variables are self-explanatory.
The above equation can be estimated without and with individual fixed
effects. The fixed effects allow to eliminate potential bias sources like un-
observed heterogeneity among workers. If workers with greater unobserved
ability are more likely to work in certain industries, part of the industry
dummy reflects the return to unobserved ability rather than a rent. The ear-
lier literature has found that inter-industry wage differentials are typically
robust to the introduction of individual fixed effects, although somewhat
smaller.10
10See Saint-Paul (1996b), ch.5 for a survey.
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We can then construct synthetic indicators of labor market rents.
We first define the ”spread” indicator for any date s, as
SPREADs = max
k
cks −min
k
cks.
It tells us the difference in wages between the best-paying and the worst-
paying sector, for similar workers. If the worst-paying sector is interpreted as
perfectly competitive, then it is a measure of the highest rent paid to workers
in that economy, irrespective of the number of workers who earn the rent.11
Therefore, it would fail to capture a reduction in rents due to a fall in the
employment share of the best-paying sectors. Therefore, we also compute an
”average rent indicator” for date s as
ARENTs =
PN
k=1 nks(cks −minj cjs)PN
k=1 nks
,
where nks = number of employed in industry k at date s, and cjkN = 0 by
extension.12
This is a measure of the average rent earned by a worker in that economy,
as compared to the least-paying sector. If that sector is competitive, it
also gives us an idea of the welfare difference, in annuity terms, between an
employed and an unemployed.
Once these indicators are constructed, we look at their evolution over
time in each country. One shortcoming with the data used is that they are
only available for 7 consecutive years (3 for the UK and Germany). One
would like a longer time series dimension in order to look at the long-run
evolution of rents.
We shall also perform another exercise, namely look at wage differen-
tials across size categories of firms rather than industries, using the same
methodology.
11For date s = 1 the formula is slightly different:
SPREAD1 = max(maxk ck1, 0)−min(mink ck1, 0).
12For s = 1 the formula is again slightly different:
ARENTs =
PN
k=1 nks(cks−min(minj cjs,0))PN
k=1 nks
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5 The transition approach
The second approach, in the spirit of Cohen (1999), tries to estimate a dy-
namic process for individual transitions between employment and unemploy-
ment, and to use the estimated coefficients to compute the present discounted
value of being employed and the present discounted value of being unem-
ployed for any given category of worker. The difference between the two
gives us the total rent of the employed.
Assume that for a given category of individuals, they move between two
states, employed and unemployed. The transition rate from employment to
unemployment is s; the transition rate from unemployment to employment
is h. The income in unemployment is b and the income in employment is w.
The real interest rate is r. Workers are risk-neutral.
Then, the evolution equation for the value of being employed Ve, if defined
as the expected present discounted value of income flows when employed is:
rVe = w + s(Vu − Ve) + V˙e.
Similarly, the evolution equation for the value of being unemployed Vu is
rVu = b+ h(Ve − Vu) + V˙u.
In steady state, the total rent defined as the difference between the utility
of the employed and that of the unemployed is, i.e. by Q = Ve − Vu is
Q =
w − b
r + s+ h
.
Another concept of interest is the cost per unit of time to the employer
of having to pay the rent Q in addition to the worker’s alternative wage. It
is given by the annuity equivalent of the rent Q, i.e. q = (r + s)Q :
q =
(r + s)(w − b)
r + s+ h
.
While the total rent Q is measured in terms of workers’ welfare, the
annuity rent q expresses the same concept from the point of view of the
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firm’s labor cost. The rent q tells us how much firms have to pay workers per
unit of time in addition to their alternative wage rVu : q = w− rVu. The two
differ from each other because welfare can be transferred to workers not only
in the form of wages but in the form of job security. The rent q goes up with
s, because a higher job loss rate reduces the unemployed’s welfare. It goes
down with h for the opposite reason. In contrast, Q falls with s, because
everything else equal, the employed workers are worse-off when their jobs
are insecure. Nevertheless, the gap between their wage and their alternative
wage goes up.
In principle, if we can estimate transition rates between employment and
unemployment, as well as the income of the employed and the unemployed,
we can compute Q and q.
The most important shortcoming with that approach is that if w, b, s, and
h have different cyclical elasticities, variations in q and Q over a period of a
few years are as likely to result from the influence of business cycles as that
of underlying changes in the degree of labor market competition. In order
to control for that we pool all the countries together and impose a common
response of these variables to country-specific business cycle conditions. This
leads to the following specification.
Yit =
PX
j=1
(CDjit ∗ (aj0 + aj1 ∗ SBit) +
PX
j=1
¡
bj0ED3it + b
j
1ED2it + b
j
2AGEit + b
j
3AGE2it + b
j
4MARRIED + b
j
5SEXit
¢
∗ CDjit
+(c0Uit + c1Uit−1 + c2 lnGDPit), (2)
where Yit is one of the four variables of interest, w, b, s, and h13, P the
number of countries, and there are three blocks. The first block captures
the country-specific evolution of Y over time. The second block captures the
effect of individual characteristics, assuming country-specific responses. The
13See below for their specific definition.
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third block captures the effect of the business cycle: Uit is the unemployment
rate in the country where the individual observation is located, while GDPit
is its realGDP. The coefficients are assumed common across countries, which
allows identification. The ”structural break” dummies SBit are defined by
SBit = 0 if t ≤ t0; (3)
SBit = 1 if t > t0
They allow to compute the country-specific change in w, b, s, and h be-
tween the two subperiods defined by (3).
The second shortcoming is that it turns out to be difficult to get reliable
estimates of b, the unemployment benefit payments, from the data. The
problem is that the data base is silent about the flow of unemployment ben-
efits payments. Rather, unemployment benefits payments are reported for
the whole year and there appears to be a lag between unemployment spells
and the actual payment of corresponding benefits. My attempts at solving
it using econometric methods have failed in that they yield estimates for ∆b
that are not plausible for many countries and that no not match the evolu-
tion over time of unemployment benefits replacement ratios as estimated by
the OECD.
Therefore, we use equation (2) only for estimating ∆w,∆s, and ∆h. The
three variables of interest are defined as follows:
-lnwit, the log of individual earnings for an employed, in which case the
regression is estimated using only observations such that the individual is
employed at t. (Regression 1)
-EDit, a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is employed at t, in which
case the regression uses only observations such that the individual were un-
employed at t− 1.(Regression 3)
-UDit, a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is unemployed at t, in which
case the regression uses only observations such that the individual were em-
ployed at t− 1.(Regression 4)
The coefficient aj1 gives us the change in the relevant variable between
12
the two subperiods.
As for ∆b,we use estimates of the benefit replacement ratio ρ = b/w in
the first subperiod as reported by Nickell (2003, Table 4)14.
For any country, this allows to compute the average change in the total
rent:
∆Q/Q ≈ w
w − b∆ lnw −
b
w − b∆ ln b−
∆h
r + s+ h
− ∆s
r + s+ h
.
Or,equivalently:
∆Q/Q ≈ ∆ lnw − ρ∆ ln ρ
1− ρ −
∆h
r + s+ h
− ∆s
r + s+ h
.
This number is computed using the average unconditional values ofw, b, h,
and s in the first subsample (t = 1, ...S) and r = 0.03. Similarly, we can
compute the change in the rent in annuity terms:
∆q/q ≈ ∆ lnw − ρ∆ ln ρ
1− ρ −
∆h
r + s+ h
+
h∆s
(r + s+ h)(r + s)
.
6 Results
6.1 I: The inter-industry approach
The estimated industry coefficients are highly significant and typically range
up to 50-60 %.15 In some cases the number of observations is too low in a
given time × country × industry cell and the coefficient cannot be used. For
these reasons, I have dropped Luxembourg, Greece, and years 1999 and 2000
for Belgium. Also, the Panel stops in 1996 for Germany and the UK, starts
in 1995 for Austria, and in 1996 for Finland.
14One problem with that study, is that its estimate of the replacement ratio for Italy in
the second sub-period is unreliable. A discussion by the author with Pietro Ichino suggests
progressive move toward a replacement ratio of 0.4 in the second subperiod, starting in
1997, and a value of 0.26 in the first one, while estimating a version of (2) yields an increase
in ∆ ln ρ by just 0.02 between the two subperiods. As a reasonable compromise, we shall
take ρ = (0.26 + 0.4)/2 = 0.33 in the second subperiod.
15They are reported in an appendix available from the author upon request.
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The following tables report the main statistics of interest, i.e. the two rent
indicators SPREAD and ARENT. Note that there probably is an aberrant
observation for the Netherlands in 1998, due to a sharp drop in the estimated
industry dummy coefficient for textiles.
Country/Yr 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000
Germany 0.53 0.43 0.43
Denmark 0.27 0.31 0.26 0.17 0.33 0.31 0.26
Netherlands 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.63 0.46 0.42
Belgium 0.24 0.20 0.26 0.23 0.23
France 0.45 0.40 0.41 0.37 0.42 0.38 0.45
United Kingdom 0.66 0.57 0.62
Ireland 0.67 0.61 0.57 0.59 0.79 0.56 0.70
Italy 0.47 0.35 0.44 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.41
Spain 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.6
Portugal 0.49 0.54 0.51 0.58 0.50 0.53 0.53
Austria 0.59 0.55 0.4 0.46 0.42 0.37
Finland 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.35
Table 1 — Evolution of SPREAD.
In all countries, the SPREAD measure of rents fluctuates, but does
not seem to follow any clear trend. In other words, the rents of the best-
paid workers relative to their characteristics does not seem to vanish. The
exceptions are Austria, where rents seem to go down, and Finland and the
Netherlands, where they go up. Overall, the results confirm the findings
by Krueger and Summers that inter-industry wage differentials are quite
persistent over time.
We now turn to the ARENT measure, reported in the next Table:
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Country/Yr 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000
Germany 0.32 0.29 0.26
Denmark 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.2 0.21 0.15
Netherlands 0.15 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.45 0.22 0.17
Belgium 0.12 0.08 0.17 0.13 0.13
France 0.23 0.18 0.2 0.16 0.22 0.18 0.21
United Kingdom 0.4 0.31 0.32
Ireland 0.47 0.40 0.37 0.38 0.45 0.41 0.5
Italy 0.2 0.18 0.2 0.19 0.18 0.2 0.17
Spain 0.24 0.2 0.19 0.2 0.22 0.21 0.23
Portugal 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.16
Austria 0.47 0.36 0.3 0.35 0.34 0.26
Finland 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.27
Table 2 — Evolution of ARENT.
As table 2 shows, in most countries there is no clear upward or downward
trend for the estimated average rent. In the cases of Spain or Italy, it is
remarkably stable. Again, the rent seems to have gone down in Austria, and
to have gone up in Finland16.
An issue is that the results may be driven by sectors where there are
too few observations, implying a potentially volatile associated coefficient.
To check for that, I have constructed alternative estimates of ARENT and
SPREAD where only sectors with more than 100 observations in wave 1
are used. This implies that those variables are defined using a different
set of industries in different countries, but that is unimportant as we do
not compare the average level of the rent across countries. The results for
ARENT are reported in Table 3 for ARENT and are slightly different from
those of Table 2. Rents now seem to go down in Ireland and perhaps France
and Italy, and to go up perhaps in Finland again, with no clear pattern
elsewhere. In particular, they no longer seem falling in Austria.
16One shortcoming is that the results are substantially driven by the differences between
the agricultural sector and other sectors, as the former pays substantially less. This need
not be a problem; it may well be, for example, that the agricultural sector pays no rent at
all — people are indifferent between working in that sector and being unemployed — while
all other sectors pay rents that are similar. However, it is interesting to see how the results
are changed when one drops the agricultural sector when computing the rent indicators.
This is what we have done, and no clear pattern emerges.
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Country/Yr 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000
Germany 0.13 0.11 0.11
Denmark 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
Netherlands 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.08
Belgium 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.05
France 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.18
United Kingdom 0.22 0.25 0.2
Ireland 0.2 0.23 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.11
Italy 0.2 0.17 0.2 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17
Spain 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.2 0.22
Portugal 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.14
Austria 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07
Finland 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.09
Table 3 — Evolution of ARENT, robust definition.
The usual problem of unobserved heterogeneity among workers also ap-
plies. For this reason, I have also computed the fixed effect estimator. One
problem, though, is that if people do not move much between industries, in
such a panel with relatively few periods and observations, the fixed effects
are likely to be highly colinear with the vectors of industry dummies. Thus,
the following results have to be taken with caution.
Country/Yr 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000
Germany 0.31 0.35 0.38
Denmark 0.3 0.41 0.28 0.32 0.41 0.31 0.26
Netherlands 0.37 0.23 0.43 0.31 0.73 0.54 0.55
Belgium 0.15 0.11 0.24 0.13 0.19
France 0.29 0.25 0.32 0.24 0.32 0.27 0.28
United Kingdom 0.65 0.41 0.38
Ireland 0.49 0.40 0.35 0.36 0.66 0.56 0.60
Italy 0.3 0.19 0.28 0.18 0.26 0.27 0.26
Spain 0.4 0.16 0.12 0.24 0.18 0.30 0.32
Portugal 0.13 0.1 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.18
Austria 0.39 0.28 0.2 0.27 0.26 0.11
Finland 0.28 0.22 0.26 0.20 0.17
Table 4 — Evolution of SPREAD, fixed effects.
As we see from Table 4, the estimated spread is quite volatile. Neverthe-
16
